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Abstract
The paper aims at justifying an interpretation of Dworkin’s
theory of Law as Integrity that brings it closer to philosophi-
cal pragmatism despite his rejection of legal pragmatism. In
order to achieve this aim, this work employs a classification
of philosophical commitments that define pragmatism in a
broad and in a narrow sense and shows that legal pragma-
tism follows the main thinkers of pragmatism in the narrow
sense in committing to instrumentalism. The attribution of a
pragmatist character to Dworkin’s theory of law rests on the
idea that the adoption of a commitment to instrumentalism
is not implicated by its adoption of other pragmatist com-
mitments.
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1 Introduction
The widely known and historical polysemy of the term
‘pragmatism’, in its philosophical theoretical use, finds a
match in its use in the theory of law. Nevertheless, a
conception in particular has been standing out and get-
ting more space in discussions in the legal field, namely
the one involved in the debates between Ronald Dwor-
kin and self-titled pragmatist Richard Posner.1 Such a
conception of decisionist nature seems to claim as its
remote antecedent two tenets of Oliver Wendell
Holmes’) philosophy of law: the rejection of abstract
speculation, especially moral ones, as well as the con-
scious decision to refer the contents of judicial decisions
to its predictable social consequences.2 Its present-day
antecedent may be found in Richard Rorty’s version of
pragmatism that sees anti-theoretical and anti-systemat-
ic commitments as necessary consequences of conferring
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1. R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), at 75-104; R. Posner, ‘Concep-
tions of Legal Theory: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin’, 29 Arizona State
Law Journal 377 (1997); R. Posner, ‘The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory’, 111 Harvard Law Review 1637 (1998).
2. O.W. Holmes, O Direito Comum: as Origens do Direito Anglo-Ameri-
cano. [The Common Law]. (1963). Translation J.L. Melo; O.W. Holmes,
The Path of Law (1897) <http:// intersci. ss. uci. edu/ wiki/ eBooks/
BOOKS/ Holmes/ The%20Path%20of%20Law% 20Holmes. pdf> (last
visited 17 June 2013).
primacy to practice (in the sense of social practices) and
of anti-essentialist thought.3
In an article called ‘The banality of pragmatism and the
poetry of justice’, Rorty predictably restates the affinity
between his version of neo-pragmatism and Posner’s
philosophy of law.4 However, he surprises us by also
enlisting Dworkin into the ranks of the legal (neo) prag-
matism, despite his explicit rejection of what he con-
ceives as legal pragmatism.5
This paper intends to make a similar move bringing
Dworkin closer to a non-rortyan version of contempo-
rary philosophical pragmatism. The argument rests on
the idea that Robert Brandom’s inferencialist reading of
pragmatist theoretical commitments can serve as the
basis for a conception of contemporary philosophical
pragmatism which is, simultaneously, anti-essentialist
and based on the primacy of practical, without being for
this reason anti-theoretical and anti-systematic.6
The reasonableness of this effort to bring them closer is
justified, among other things, by the similarity between
what Brandom calls historical-expressive rationality – a
conception of rationality originally Hegelian but proper-
ly stripped of its metaphysical and teleological features
by means of the resources of an inferencialist linguistic
pragmatics – and the Dworkian demand for integrity
that guides the decisions of judges as an independent
ideal, according to an interpretation of legal social prac-
tices that shows them in their best light.7 The affinity
between philosophical pragmatism and a rationalist,
cognitivist, theory of law such as ‘Law as Integrity’
might perhaps allow the extension of the expression
‘legal pragmatism’ even beyond its already wide and
vague limits.
3. R. Rorty, ‘Un Mundo sem Substâncias ou Essências’. [A World without
Substances or Essences], in C. Magro and A.M. Pereira (eds.), Pragma-
tismo: a Filosofia da Criação e da Mudança (2000) 53.
4. R. Rorty, ‘The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice’, in R.
Rorty (ed.), Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), at 93.
5. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at 175.
6. R. Brandom, ‘Analyzing Pragmatism: Pragmatics and Pragmatisms’, in
R. Brandom (ed.), Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent &
Contemporary (2011) 56.
7. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5.
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2 Dworkin and Legal
Pragmatism
The main difficulty in devising an argument that brings
Dworkin’s law as Integrity closer to philosophical prag-
matism, and consequently in developing a sense of legal
pragmatism that both fits his theory of law and is con-
ceivable as an extension or application of philosophical
pragmatism to the legal field, is Dworkin’s explicit
rejection of legal pragmatism.8 Even recognising that
legal pragmatism shares the merit of being an interpre-
tive theory of law with his own conception, and there-
fore is superior to semantic theories of law such as legal
positivism, he claims that if legal pragmatism is right,
his own theory of law is wrong and vice versa, that they
are opposite theories.9
The awkwardness of this situation is that, at the same
time, it is easy to spot some theoretical commitments
typical of philosophical pragmatism in his theory of law
and hard to miss the aversion and critical stance adopted
towards the instrumentalism characteristic of both legal
pragmatism and classical American pragmatism.
The strategy – but in no way the arguments – adopted
here is recognisably a Rortyan one: to broaden the scope
of philosophical pragmatism in order to include the the-
oretical commitments of classical pragmatism as well as
the accomplishment of other philosophers that share
some of these commitments, but not necessarily all of
them. It is also Rortyan the strategy of identifying
Dworkin’s criticism of legal pragmatism with the criti-
cism of its crass instrumentalism. As will be seen ahead,
it is this theoretical commitment to instrumentalism
that characterises the distinction between pragmatism in
broad and narrow sense.
One cannot agree with Rorty, however, when he claims
that:
Dworkin’s polemics against legal realism appear as no
more than an attempt to sound a note of Kantian
moral rigorism as he continues to do exactly the sort
of thing the legal realists wanted done.10
or when, in an attempt to make the interpretation above
plausible, he claims that:
For myself, I find it hard to discern any interesting
philosophical differences between Unger, Dworkin
and Posner; their differences strike me as entirely
political, as differences about how much change and
what sort of change American institutions need.11
Seeing Dworkin’s theory of law as an attenuated or dis-
guised form of legal realism, is to ignore the authority of
past over future applications of legal concepts, central to
the idea of integrity.
8. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5.
9. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 151-75.
10. Rorty (1999), above n. 4, at 93.
11. Rorty (1999), above n. 4, at 94.
Also, understanding the disagreement between Dworkin
and self-titled legal pragmatists not as a philosophical
difference concerning what the law is – understood as
social practice – but as a disagreement about political
preferences, however broadly one takes the meaning of
the term ‘political’, amounts to acknowledge a radical
separation between what the law is and what the law
ought to be, something entirely incompatible with
Dworkin’s criticism of legal positivism. In fact, it is the
rejection of this separation what makes both Law as
Integrity and legal pragmatism examples of interpretive
theories of law, as opposed to legal positivism, under-
stood as victim of the semantic sting.12
If the mentioned strategy works, it will be allowed to say
that, although Dworkin is not a legal pragmatist in the
known and time-honored sense of Holmes (2013) or
Posner (2010), he is in some sense also a legal pragmatist
because his theory may also be seen as an application to
law of pragmatist philosophical commitments.13
3 Two Senses of Philosophical
Pragmatism
The first step, then, is to discern the different philo-
sophical commitments that shape pragmatism in its
broader sense and in its narrower, classical American,
sense.
Brandom’s analytic classification of pragmatist commit-
ments is the point of departure. He distinguishes prag-
matism, narrowly thought, ‘[…] as a philosophical
school of thought centered at evaluating beliefs by their
tendency to promote success at the satisfaction of
wants’, whose emblematic adherents are Peirce, James,
and Dewey, from pragmatism in a broader sense:
[…] a movement centered on the primacy of the
practical, initiated already by Kant, whose twentieth
century avatar include not only Peirce, James and
Dewey, but also the early Heidegger, the latter Witt-
genstein, and such figures as Quine, Sellars, David-
son, Rorty and Putnam.14
He considers the narrow sense of Pragmatism, and its
commitment to an instrumental order of explanation of
belief and truth, to be a way of working out the commit-
ments that constitute pragmatism in a broader sense.
Pragmatism, in the broadest possible sense, means to
him giving general explanatory pride of place to practi-
ces and the practical.15 This idea unfolds, in a more
determinate way, in a corresponding commitment to the
explanatory priority of pragmatic theorising over
semantic theorising. The idea that semantics must
answer to pragmatics is a pragmatist one in a distinctive
12. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 46.
13. Holmes (1897), above n. 2.
14. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 56.
15. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 58.
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sense. The meaning Brandom attaches to these terms is
broad:
[…] pragmatics is the systematic or theoretical study
of the use of linguistic expressions, and semantics is
the systematic or theoretical study of the contents they
express or convey.16
According to Brandom, this commitment implies, even
for the philosophers that wrote before the linguistic
turn, an understanding of language as a kind of doing, as
a practice or activity. The primary focus on the order of
linguistic explanation is on the activity of saying, as
opposed to focusing on what is said, the meaning or
content.
To Classical American Pragmatism, this theoretical
move was also compatible with, if not required by, their
resolute determination to accommodate the discoveries
and contributions of Darwinian evolutionism in a natu-
ralist philosophical conception of rational (linguistic)
creatures as continuous with the rest of living nature
(and even inorganic nature, as in the even more radical
reconciliation sought by Peirce in his evolutionary cos-
mology).17
Brandom attributes another pragmatist commitment,
derived from the previous one, to the philosophers men-
tioned above: ‘the point of talking about the content
expressed or the meaning possessed by linguistic
expressions is to explain at least some features of their
use’.18
This is a commitment to a methodological Pragmatism:
seeing semantic theorising as answering to pragmatics
by taking pragmatic theory as it’s explanatory target.
Taking the success of the theoretical semantic enterprise
to be assessed according pragmatic criteria of adequacy
allows the sorting out of genuine semantic theories from
others on the basis of it explaining or not a central fea-
ture of linguistic practice.
Another pragmatist commitment derived from the
explanatory primacy of the practical, another way of
making semantics answer to pragmatics, is semantic
pragmatism: ‘[…] the view that it is the way practition-
ers use the expressions that makes them mean what they
do’.19 This commitment imposes a methodological
requirement on semantic theorising: when one
[…] associates with expressions some semantic rele-
vant whatsis as its content and meaning, she under-
takes an obligation to explain what it is about the use
of that expression that establishes in practice the
association between it and the semantically relevant
whatsis.20
16. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 57.
17. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 6.
18. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 58.
19. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 61.
20. Ibid.
Semantic pragmatism, although related to, is different
from methodological pragmatism. But the difference is
subtle. The methodological pragmatist
[…] looks at the explanation of the practice of using
expressions, the subject of pragmatics, in terms of the
contents associated with those expressions, the sub-
ject of semantics. The semantic pragmatist looks at
the explanation of the association of contents with
expressions in terms of the practice of using those
expressions. While those explanations may be facets
of the same story, they need not be.21
A further way in which the primacy of the practical
unfolds is the commitment to the explanatory priority of
‘Knowing how’ over ‘knowing that’ named fundamental
pragmatism by Brandom.22 According to it, the intelligi-
bility of explicit theoretical beliefs depends on the exis-
tence of a background of implicit practical abilities. It is
the opposite of the platonic intellectualist strategy of
explaining practical abilities in terms of the grasp of
some principles, some privileged bits of ‘knowing that’.
Brandom points out that taking the capacity to entertain
beliefs and acquire knowledge as parasitic on capacities
to do things more primitive than thinking, believing,
and saying, in the sense that it is not yet one of these, is
something we find even in the older members of the
brief list of philosophers mentioned earlier.23 The fact
that we can find it in the first Heidegger as well as in
Dewey, for example, also supports the attribution of this
commitment to philosophers on both sides of the analyt-
ic-continental gap, reinforcing the idea of a wider sense
of pragmatism than the one defined by the theoretical
commitments undertaken by the classical American tri-
umvirate.
This fundamental pragmatism take its force, in part,
from its ability to present itself simultaneously as a
determination and clearer expression of the fundamental
pragmatic insight according to which practice takes
explanatory precedence.
But its force comes, in part, from its ability to solve the
problem of infinite regress characteristic of the attempt
to start to explain believing (a dimension of linguistic
practice) in terms of explicit ‘know that’ instead of
implicit ‘know how’.
Brandom shows that the heart of the problem is also the
indication of its solution: the inferential nature of
beliefs. According to him
Beliefs would be idle unless the believer could at least
some times tell what followed from them (what else
they committed the believer to) and what was incom-
patible with them.24
However, sorting out among beliefs which ones are
compatible or incompatible with some other belief, and
21. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 63.
22. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 65.
23. Ibid.
24. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 66.
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which ones are consequences of it, is at the same time
something that can be done right or wrong and some-
thing for which a finite explicit regulation cannot be giv-
en. For if there are explicit rules to follow in correctly
sorting incompatibilities and inferential consequences,
these last rules could be rightly or wrongly followed,
demanding a new set of explicit rules located at a superi-
or level, and so forth.
The solution to this problem is agreeing with Wittgen-
stein and the other pragmatists on the inevitable bend-
ing of the shovel: ‘[…] distinguishing the potential
beliefs that are incompatible with a given belief, and
those that are its inferential consequences is a practical
skill or ability: a kind of know how’.25
This commitment is worked out in different ways by
different philosophers. Brandom’s strategy involves
developing a neo-Hegelian account of the expressive
function of logic, which encompasses acknowledging the
existence of material inferences, transitions, and incom-
patibility relations between propositions and between
assertions which are good not in virtue of its form, but
of its content.26
These material inferences, a kind of content related
inferential license, are in turn instituted by the activity
of practically assessing the linguistic performances of
others, the activity of treating a transition as good or
bad, of taking a move in the language game to be good
or bad (not of saying that it is).
The fourth and final commitment Brandom attributes
to pragmatism in the broad sense is a commitment to
specifying linguistic practices in terms of some sort of
normative status, to employ normative vocabulary in
pragmatic theory.27 Commitment to this normative
pragmatics seems to him unavoidable, if one wants give
an account of the practice of using linguistic expressions
that
I) [is] to be explained by semantics, according to
methodological pragmatism; II) establish the associa-
tion of linguistic expressions with semantic interpre-
tants, according to semantic pragmatism; and III)
constitute the practical know how against the back-
ground of which alone the capacity to know believe or
think that can be made intelligible, according to fun-
damental pragmatism.28
This commitment was already undertaken by Kant.
Brandom sees as one of the most fundamental Kantian
insights the idea that what distinguishes the activities of
rational beings, judgments, and actions, from the behav-
iour of non-rational creatures is that judgments and
actions are things one is responsible for. They involve,
in an essential way, the undertaking of commitments.29
25. Ibid.
26. R. Brandom, ‘Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism’, in R.
Brandom (ed.), Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism
(2003) 45.
27. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 68.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
According to this interpretation, Kant takes judging and
acting as discursive activities, since it consists in the
applications of concepts and sees concepts as rules that
define to what one has committed oneself in judging and
acting the way he did. These rules make possible to
assess the correction of judgments and actions in terms
of facts and intentions, respectively.
Hence, Brandom takes Kant’s account of conceptual
contents as aimed at establishing conditions of correct-
ness to our practical performances of acting and assert-
ing.30 That makes him a methodological pragmatism
whose account of discursive practices employs norma-
tive vocabulary.
A contemporary version of that commitment to norma-
tive pragmatics can be seen in Frege’s distinction
between force and content. As Brandom reads him, for
the young Frege, claiming is associating a pragmatic
assertional force with a sentence. He also takes asser-
tional force as a kind normative assessment, since he
sees asserting a sentence as taking it to be true, and truth
to be a form of correctness.31
Something along the same lines can be said of the latter
Wittgenstein on Brandom’s account.32 One of the cen-
tral subjects of Philosophical Investigations is the exis-
tence of norms implicit in practices. That is why, for
Wittgenstein as well, to take a linguistic performance to
have certain meaning is committing oneself to the cor-
rectness and incorrectness of some uses of the expres-
sion.33 To grasp a concept or intention is to commit to
norms implicit in practice that define the correct use of
the first and the fulfillment of the second.
Brandom sees the later Wittgenstein’s version of the
regress argument as qualifying him as a fundamental
pragmatism, as well as a normative pragmatism.34 His
argument about the necessary end of interpretations (the
name he gives to a rule to apply or follow a rule) con-
cludes with the acknowledgement that norms explicit in
the form of rules can only be understood against a back-
ground of norms implicit in practices.
While the first three commitments that define the three
more specific notions of pragmatism above may be easily
applied to Classical American Pragmatism, it seems that
normative pragmatism cannot be reconciled with their
naturalistic approach to semantic and pragmatic theoris-
ing. This apparent impossibility emerges, at first sight,
from the difficulty of naturalistic theoretical enterprises
in reconciling the existence of a normative dimension
implicit in linguistic social practices with the idea that
this same practices are in continuity with the doings of
other creatures in nature. At a first glance, it may appear
hard to run this normative dimension together with the
notion that the difference between sapient creatures and
sentient ones is a matter of degree, not of their nature.
For, how would it be possible to recognise the doings of
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 69.
33. L. Wittgenstein, Investigações Filosóficas [Philosophical Investigations]
(1999) Translation José Carlos Bruni, at 91-92, 195-99.
34. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 69.
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sentient creatures as normatively structured and respon-
sive to norms?
But this is not the case. In fact, as Brandom reads the
classical American pragmatist movement, this reconcili-
ation is precisely the enterprise in which they were
involved. They showed it is possible to acknowledge
that the specification of social practices needed to work
out the commitments to methodological, semantic, and
fundamental pragmatism requires the employment of
normative vocabularies – talk about commitments and
about correctness and incorrectness of performance –
while searching for a naturalist strategy to understand
the working of normative assessments.35
Brandom understands classical pragmatists as pragma-
tists in all the senses discerned above.36 The explanatory
priority they give to habits, practical skills, and abilities
qualifies them as fundamental pragmatists. Their meth-
odological pragmatism is manifest in their taking the
point of talking about what we mean or believe – name-
ly, semantic talk about meaning and content – to be the
clarification of what we do, of our habits, of our practi-
ces of solving problems, and seeking goals. They are also
semantic pragmatists since they explain the meaning of
utterances and the content of beliefs in terms of the
roles of those utterances and beliefs play in social practi-
ces. Brandom aligns them alongside Kant, Frege, and
Wittgenstein as endorsing a normative pragmatics, what
in conjunction with their fundamental pragmatism
implies their being also normative pragmatists.37
What makes it sometimes hard to see is the exclusively
instrumental account they give of the norms that struc-
ture our cognitive practices. According to Brandom,
classical pragmatism acknowledges only instrumental
norms structuring human cognitive practices.38 Instru-
mental norms, in this sense, are assessments of perform-
ances as correct or incorrect in terms of their contribu-
tion to the successful achievement of goals.
This is the kind of norms they see as implicit in discur-
sive (conceptual) practice and, because of this, they are
also the norms their semantic pragmatism treats as the
ultimate source of specific semantic explicit normative
assessments such as truth assessments. The result is a
conception of truth in terms of usefulness and a corre-
sponding understanding of the contents of utterances
and intentional states in terms of their contribution in
getting what one wants. This line of thought allows
Brandom to describe Peirce, Dewey, and James as
instrumental normative pragmatists.39
This description, however, is far from consensual
among contemporary pragmatists. Some of them, like
Haack and Putnam, reject Brandom and Rorty’s attribu-
tion of instrumentalism to classical American pragma-
35. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 70.
36. Ibid.
37. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 71.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
tism as an error of interpretation.40 It must be acknowl-
edged that they are right concerning Peirce. Although
his pragmatic maxim is formulated in a way that, if con-
sidered apart from his other theoretical concerns, allows
an instrumentalist reading, the association of Peirce’s
conception of truth as idealised justification with his
recognition of truth as a goal of inquiry certainly ends
the dispute.
Attempts to eschew attributions of instrumentalism to
James and Dewey, however, are not so successful. Some
specialists in the classical American pragmatism have
been going to some pains to reject the attribution of
instrumentalism to James and Dewey. Regarding Ror-
ty’s and Brandom’s instrumentalist reading of the classi-
cal pragmatists’ account of norms structuring linguistic
social practices – and therefore the correction of per-
formances – Putnam, in his response to an earlier ver-
sion of Brandom’s paper discussed here, says that:
[…] the fact remains that serious students of pragma-
tism have spent almost a century rebutting the sort of
travesty of what the classical pragmatists thought that
Brandom relies on, and it must not be allowed to go
unrebutted now.41
He then argues that, since the beginning of his philo-
sophical theorising,
Peirce insisted that the interest that drives pure sci-
entific inquiry is utterly different from the interests
that drive ordinary practical inquiry. […] Moreover,
as early as Peirce’s famous ‘The Fixation of Belief ’,
the interest that drives scientific inquiry is identified
with the interest in having one’s beliefs fixed by ‘an
external permanency’, by ‘nothing human’. In short,
it is the aims of pure science (which are sui generis, in
referring to the indefinitely long run) that Peirce has
in mind here (as elsewhere), and not the wants of the
agent (unless what the agent wants is truth).42
Concerning Peirce, these considerations are hard to
reject. The arguments he raises against instrumentalist
central features in James’ pragmatism, however, are less
convincing. The alluded fact that James speaks of
‘agreement with reality’ and ‘correspondence’ through-
out his work loses much of its force when supplemen-
ted, as it were, by the consideration that this notion is in
itself in need of explanation, and by the kind of explana-
tions he provided. Putnam, himself, implicitly recogni-
ses this when he says that ‘James also thinks that what
40. S. Haack, ‘Pragmatism, Old and New’, 1 Contemporary Pragmatism 3
(2004); H. Putnam, ‘Comment on Robert Brandom’s Paper’, in J. Con-
ant and U. Zeglen (eds.), Hillary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism
(2002) 59; Brandom, (2011), above n. 6, at 70-81; R. Rorty, ‘Verdade
sem correspondência com a Realidade’ [Truth Without Correspondence
to Reality], in C. Magro and A.M. Pereira (eds.), Pragmatismo: A Filoso-
fia da Criação e da Mudança (2000b) 17, at 34-52.
41. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 59.
42. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 60.
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kinds of contact with realities will count as “fruitful”
depends on our “aesthetic and practical nature”’.43
Putnam’s way to deflate the instrumentalist aura of
these considerations is to run it together with realism-
oriented quotations such as these:
Reality is in general what truths have to take account
of; and the first part of reality from this point of view
is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are forced
upon us, coming we know not whence. Over their
nature, order and quantity we have as good as no con-
trol.44
But then, again, the ‘cash value’ of James’ use of the
realist vocabulary of correspondence to address the cor-
rection and validity of social practices of enquiry betrays
Putnam’s aim of avoiding attributions of instrumental-
ism to James’ pragmatism. The use of criteria such as
‘interests’ in the selection of the sensations makes it
clear:
[…] we have a certain freedom in our dealings with
these elements of reality, and that in particular which
[of our sensations] we attend to, note, and make
emphatic in our conclusions depends on our inter-
ests; and according as we lay the emphasis here or
there, quite different formulations of truth result. We
read the same facts differently.45
This swinging back and forth, between apparent realist
remarks and its instrumentalist specification, is inter-
preted by Putnam as proof that ‘[…] James rejects both
the view that agreement with reality isn’t required at all
for truth (or isn’t a meaningful notion) and the Peircean
view that our convergence to certain beliefs will be
forced on us “by nothing human”.’46 The neopragma-
tist, then, expects the rejection of Brandom’s instru-
mentalism depiction of the norms implicit in practices,
in James’ Pragmatism, to follow from the conclusion
above.
However, even if one considers the quotations Putnam
selected as highly representative of James’ position, and
supportive of this last remark, she or he can still disa-
gree with the conclusion he draws: the norms implicit
structuring linguistic social practices and the correction
of performances in James thought cannot be instrumen-
tal in nature. These quotations may as well support the
idea that, for James, although sensory experience,
broadly construed, institute certain limits to inquiry, the
bits of experience that become candidates to selection
are made so guided by practical and aesthetic considera-
tions. How one cuts reality in its joints, then, would be
guided by human interests, and true knowledge result-
ing from inquiry could only be so if, at least holistically,
directed at these practical goals.
43. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 61.
44. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 62.
45. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 63.
46. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 61.
Suzan Haack, in her paper Pragmatism, Old & New, also
intends to mitigate the instrumentalist aspects of James’
pragmatism. Her conclusions, however, are much more
ambiguous and nuanced than Putnam’s. Haack inter-
prets James as taking Peirce’s pragmatic maxim as the
center of his own version of pragmatism. However, the
idea of identifying the meaning of a concept with the
consequences for conduct of the affirmation or denial of
the concept led them to different paths:
[…] while Peirce’s philosophy matured in a logical
and realist style, James’s evolved in a more psycho-
logical and nominalist vein. Moreover, unlike Peirce,
James thought philosophy would do well to go round
Kant, rather than through him; he was more influ-
enced by the British empiricists, and dedicated his
Pragmatism to John Stuart Mill.47
She points out that this becomes progressively clear as
the mature and realist Peirce starts to get uneasy with
the encouragement the formulation of the maxim gives
to completely subordinating knowing to doing. It con-
trasts with
James’s readiness to construe ‘the consequences of a
belief’ in a way that includes not only the consequen-
ces of the truth of the proposition believed, but also
the consequences of the person’s believing it.48
Haack sees James’ interpretation of the pragmatic max-
im as influencing the subsequent development of his
defense of the will to believe, with its corollary that
beliefs that cannot in principle be verified or falsified –
like religious ones – may be validated by its effect in
one’s life.49 Although it might be the case that James
insistence on the separation of his pragmatism from the
will to believe – on the basis that the former concerns
the policy of believing while the latter concerns the
character of truth – points to his rejection of a strong
instrumentalism, Haack thinks he was not able to keep
them apart:
“For if it [the pragmatic maxim] is construed as tying
meaning to the pragmatic consequences of a proposi-
tion’s being true, the pragmatic maxim would under-
mine the doctrine of the Will to Believe; while if it is
construed as tying meaning to the pragmatic conse-
quences of a proposition’s being believed, the prag-
matic maxim and the Will to Believe really do blur
into each another”.50
This blurring can be seen as a strong reason in favour of
the attribution of instrumentalism to his philosophy,
and it emerges frequently when the pragmatist address-
es the concept of truth in Pragmatism:
47. S. Haack, ‘Pragmatism, Old and New’, 1 Contemporary Pragmatism 3
(2004), at 12.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Haack (2004), above n. 47, at 13.
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Theories thus become instruments, not answers to
enigmas, in which we can rest (p. 53); The practical
value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the
practical importance of their objects to us (p. 203);
[…] ideas […] become true just in so far as they help
us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of
our experience (p. 58); The true is the name of whatev-
er proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good,
too, for definite, assignable reasons. Surely you must
admit this, that if there were no good for life in true
ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively
disadvantageous and false ideas the only useful ones,
then the current notion that truth is divine and pre-
cious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown
up or become a dogma (p. 76) [..] truth becomes a
habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their inter-
vals of rest from their verifying activities (p. 222);
‘The true,’ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient
in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only
the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient
in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run
and on the whole of course; for what meets expedi-
ently all the experience in sight won’t necessarily
meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily.51
Haack considers that the only available resource for
weakening the impression of strong instrumentalism
emanating from James definitions of theory and of truth
rests in his radical empiricism. In addition, she sees it as
the result of a holistic turn in the concept of experience
that accommodates both the notion of ‘ideas’ as a part of
experience, and experience as a continuous, endless,
self-correcting enterprise: ‘Experience has ways of boil-
ing over, and making us correct our present formulas’.52
She thinks that ‘The robustness of James’s response
crucially depends on his keeping his account firmly
anchored in the long run of experience’.53 However,
James’ nominalist and verificationist preference limits
the success of this interpretative strategy:
[…] his success in this is at best limited. James disas-
sociates himself from the disconnectedness of earlier
empiricisms, and specifically from the idea that simi-
lars have nothing really in common, or that the causal
tie is nothing but habitual conjunction; so he might,
like Peirce, have appealed to the reality of kinds and
laws to underpin his conception of Truth absolute.
[…] But his predilection for the particular leads to an
insistence that pragmatists focus on concrete truths,
leaving abstract Truth for “intellectualists” to worry
about; and his discomfort with the notion of the veri-
fiable reinforces this preference for concrete truths
actually verified.54
The movement of downplaying abstract truth in favour
of concrete ‘truths’, and the neglect of the dependence
51. W. James, Pragmatism (1907), at 53, 203, 58, 76, 222.
52. James (1907), above n. 51, at 222.
53. Haack (2004), above n. 47, at 14.
54. Ibid.
of the latter on the former, in his definitions of truth,
keeps James tied to a verificationist conception of truth
and an instrumentalist conception of the norms struc-
turing social, linguistic, cognitive practices.
Regarding Dewey’s version of pragmatism, Putnam’s
efforts to avoid the attribution of instrumentalism follow
a different path. Dewey’s exclusive concern with ‘war-
ranted assertability’ in his most explicitly pragmatist
work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, makes it the point of
departure. Even if a warrantedly assertable belief
becomes so for being able to solve a problematical situa-
tion,
[…] it isn’t the case that satisfying wants is sufficient
for resolving a problematical situations – as a staunch
cognitivist, Dewey is quite willing to say that you may
have the wrong wants. Nor is it the case that resolving
a problematical situation is sufficient for warrantedly
assertability: you may not have inquired sufficiently
well to be warranted in thinking the belief resolves the
problematical situation even if it does.55
The correctness of these remarks, however, does not
entitle Putnam to conclude that Dewey did not adopt an
instrumentalist version of normative pragmatism. The
opportunity of correcting one’s ends in the light of a
better understanding of the means to achieve them – or
even the possibility of adopting directly a critical stance
towards these ends – do not exclude all forms of instru-
mentalism.
It is important to acknowledge that the adoption of this
holist turn significantly distances Dewey from a crass
instrumentalism. The continued perfecting of ends
allowed by the convergence of his contrite falibilism
with his cognitivism on values makes room for Putnam
remark that there are ‘[…] several respects in which
Dewey thinks that evaluating beliefs simply in terms of
their tendency to “secure some end or achieve some
goal” is quite inadequate’.56
Nevertheless, an unequivocal instrumentalist character
remains connected with Dewey’s idea that inquiry, in
general, consists in problem solving. Haack is especially
attentive to the particularity of Dewey’s instrumental-
ism when she stresses his concern with how thought
processes experimentally determine future conduct and
his aim of integrating in a holistic, anti-dualistic man-
ner, the agent/knower beliefs about the world and his
beliefs about values.57 Although Dewey shares with
Peirce the idea of inquiry as an active process that leads
from doubt to settled belief, his instrumentalism can be
seen in the fact that his method for settling beliefs does
not revolve around being constrained by an independent
reality:
Dewey sounds less like Peirce when, after pointing
out that inquiry is a kind of practice, to be judged,
like other practices, by its purposive success, he con-
55. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 61.
56. Putnam, (2002), above n. 40, at 64.
57. Haack (2004), above n. 47, at 16.
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tinues – by its purposive success rather than by some
supposed standard of accuracy of reflection of its
objects. The object of knowledge is not an immuta-
ble, independent reality, but is in part constituted by
our cognitive interactions with it. Inquiry, discover-
ing “provisional facts” and conjecturing possible sol-
utions, transforms a problematic, indeterminate sit-
uation into a determinate one.58
And in Dewey’s attempt to develop a better notion of
experience than the classical empiricist one, Haack also
identifies ‘[…] a more radical step, from the idea that
experience is active in the sense of requiring intelligent
manipulation, experimentation, and selection, to the
idea that it somehow constitutes its objects’.59
Dewey understands Logic – in a broad sense that
includes but is not reducible to formal logic – as the
normative theory of enquiry:
The way in which men do “think” denotes, as it is
here interpreted, simply the ways in which men at a
given time carry on their inquiries. […] we are able to
contrast various kinds of inquiry that are in use or
that have been used in respect to their economy and
efficiency in reaching warranted conclusions. We
know that some methods of inquiry are better than
others in just the same way in which we know that
some methods of surgery, farming, road-making,
navigating or what-not are better than others. It does
not follow in any of these cases that the “better”
methods are ideally perfect, or that they are regula-
tive or “normative” because of conformity to some
absolute form. They are the methods which experi-
ence up to the present time shows to be the best
methods available for achieving certain results, while
abstraction of these methods does supply a (relative)
norm or standard for further undertakings.60
In other words, Dewey describes inquiry as a norma-
tively structured activity whose norms are produced by
generalisations of some specific methods employed in
the past: the ones that proved to be, in experience, the
best methods for achieving certain results. Thus, he
understands logic as an explicit codification of recom-
mendations about how to inquire. These recommenda-
tions are abstracted from the procedures that proved to
work in practice.
The best way to conciliate these perspectives – the
instrumentalist aspects of their definitions of theory,
truth, and inquiry, on one hand, and their complaints
regarding crass instrumentalist interpretations of their
philosophy, on the other – seems to be to attribute to
James and Dewey not only the adoption of instrumen-
talist strategies, but also some degree of awareness that
commitment to instrumentalism is only a strategy for
working out the other pragmatist commitments, and so
should not cloud them. That may as well be what the
58. Haack (2004), above n. 47, at 17.
59. Haack (2004), above n. 47, at 18.
60. J. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1939), at 103,104.
complaints they made about some instrumentalist inter-
pretations of their work having pushed pragmatism too
far are about.
However, this awareness is intermittent. The emphasis
placed, by their critics and by the classical pragmatists
themselves, on the instrumental aspect of pragmatism
has eclipsed, from their critics and from themselves, the
four more relevant pragmatist commitments that shape
their philosophy, in Brandom’s view.61
Since the attribution of instrumentalism to Peirce does
not hold, and since Brandom’s analysis of pragmatism
ends in a definition of classical pragmatism consisting in
the undertaking of all five pragmatist commitments
above, from now on when talking about classical prag-
matism Peirce should be excluded. The invention and
the keeping of the name ‘pragmaticism’ to differentiate
his thought from the thought of the rest of the pragma-
tists, especially their instrumentalism in matters of
inquiry and truth, shows that Peirce would have no
problem with this.
This is how he describes the episode that led to the cre-
ation of the neologism:
His word ‘pragmatism’ has gained general recogni-
tion in a generalised sense that seems to argue power
of growth and vitality. The famed psychologist,
James, first took it up, seeing that his ‘radical empiri-
cism; substantially answered to the writer’s definition
of pragmatism, albeit with a certain difference in the
point of view. Next, the admirably clear and brilliant
thinker, Mr. Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, casting about
for a more attractive name for the ‘anthropomor-
phism’ of his Riddle of the Sphinx, lit, in that most
remarkable paper of his on Axioms as Postulates, upon
the same designation ‘pragmatism’, which in its origi-
nal sense was in generic agreement with his own doc-
trine, for which he has since found the more appro-
priate specification ‘humanism’, while he still retains
‘pragmatism’ in a somewhat wider sense. So far all
went happily. But at present, the word begins to be
met with occasionally in the literary journals, where it
gets abused in the merciless way that words have to
expect when they fall into literary clutches. Some-
times the manners of the British have effloresced in
scolding at the word as ill-chosen, – ill-chosen, that
is, to express some meaning that it was rather
designed to exclude. So then, the writer, finding his
bantling ‘pragmatism’ so promoted, feels that it is
time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its
higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of
expressing the original definition, he begs to
announce the birth of the word ‘pragmaticism’,
which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.62
At first glance, the episode seems only to express
Peirce’s reaction to the abuse the word ‘pragmatism’
suffered because of the circulation of pragmatists theses
61. Brandom (2011), above n. 6, at 71.
62. C.S. Peirce, ‘Letter to Signor Calderoni’, XV The Monist 161 (1905), at
165.
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in the literary circles of the time. Peirce was not both-
ered, then, with its use by the other classical pragmatists
to denote their partially different conception of the
pragmatic maxim.
However, in a letter dated from the same year, Peirce
already seems to think that his new world would have
the effect of distinguishing his interpretation of the
pragmatic maxim from that of the others pragmatists:
In the April number of the Monist I proposed that
the word ‘pragmatism’ should hereafter be used
somewhat loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller,
James, Dewey, Royce, and the rest of us, while the
particular doctrine which I invented the word to
denote, which is your first kind of pragmatism,
should be called ‘pragmaticism.’ The extra syllable
will indicate the narrower meaning.63
A year later, in a paper called A Sketch of Logical Critics,
the scope of differentiating his thought from the instru-
mentalist interpretation of the pragmatic maxim he
criticised in James and Schiller, seemed to have become
the main reason for sustaining the world ‘pragmaticism’
to denote his own views:
I have always fathered my pragmaticism (as I have
called it since James and Schiller made the word
[pragmatism] imply ‘the will to believe,’ the mutabili-
ty of truth, the soundness of Zeno’s refutation of
motion, and pluralism generally), upon Kant, Berke-
ley, and Leibniz, and have rated J. S. Mill by the fatal
inaccuracy of his reasoning, as decidedly inferior to
his father.64
Putnam also shares this interpretation. Criticising the
idea that ‘Beliefs are true insofar as they are good tools or
instruments for getting what one wants’, he says of it that it
is ‘Precisely the misunderstanding that Peirce feared
when he changed the name of his philosophy from
“pragmatism” to “pragmaticism”!’65
If this argument is sound, it is possible to see Peirce as
rejecting the instrumentalism James and Dewey sustain.
The great advantage of construing the norms implicit in
practices in instrumental terms is, for them, the synthe-
sis it allows between normative pragmatism and a Dar-
winian naturalism, a way to understand human practices
as normative that is not mysterious, dualistic, or meta-
physical, and that allows one to see them as continuous
with the rest of nature.
63. C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, Eds. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. Burks
(1931-58), 1958, 8.205.
64. C.S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings
(1998), at 457.
65. Putnam (2002), above n. 40, at 64.
4 Legal Pragmatism and
Instrumentalism
Of the five pragmatist commitments that shape the clas-
sical pragmatist movement’s philosophy, the one that
was more intensely absorbed, and in some cases solely
absorbed, by theoretical applications of pragmatism in
the field of law was instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism is what boils behind Posner’s resolute
anti-theoretical claims that philosophical theory, even
pragmatist philosophical theory, is irrelevant to legal
pragmatism and legal practice.66 Such myopic absorp-
tion also help understanding Holmes’ conception of law
as prophecy, and his taking the judges conceptions of
social benefit as supreme hermeneutic criteria.
In his The Path of Law, Holmes presents a series of
instrumentalist claims and slogans.67 About law as
object of inquiry, for example, he claims that ‘[…] the
object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumen-
tality of the courts’.68 In the same spirit, he claims that
‘the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law’.69
Sometimes, the instrumentalism in Holmes’ conception
of law leans towards utilitarianism, when he claims that:
judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize
their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of
the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with
such considerations is simply to leave the very
ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and
often unconscious, as I have said.70
Holmes also highlights in the same book, that priority
should be given, in the shaping of lawyers, to the study
of economy, thus anticipating more radical and utilitari-
an versions of legal pragmatism such as those exhibited
by Posner and by the Law and Economics movement.71
There certainly are other elements on Holmes’ concep-
tion of law that seem to follow from those other pragma-
tist theoretical commitments, shared by pragmatists in
broad sense. The more relevant ones are the under-
standing of law not as a closed system of norms, but as a
social practice, as well as the understanding of the con-
tent of law as subjected to a historical process of trans-
formation and improvement.72 Such features, however,
play a secondary role when compared with those fea-
tures following from instrumentalism.
The same thing can be said of the sketch of a pragmatist
conception of law that emerges from Dewey’s My Phi-
66. R. Posner, Direito, Pragmatismo e Democracia [Law, Pragmatism and
Democray] (2010) Translation Teresa Dias Carneiro, at 32-3.
67. Holmes (1897), above n. 2.
68. Holmes (1897), above n. 2, at 2.
69. Holmes (1897), above n. 2, at 4.
70. Holmes (1897), above n. 2, at 9.
71. Holmes (1897), above n. 2, at 16.
72. Holmes (1897), above n. 2, at 1, 3, 11.
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losophy of Law and Logical Method and Law.73 Although
in the first paper Dewey makes an effort to show the
social – in the sense of interactional or intersubjective –
origins of law, when it comes down to describing the
activities of those involved in legal social practices in the
second paper, instrumentalism dominates entirely.
After criticising the syllogistic conception of legal inqui-
ry and discussing at some length his own proposal of
legal inquiry as an instantiation of the active, experi-
mental, and empirical process of inquiry that he calls
logic – or, more precisely, the logic of discovery – char-
acteristic of the reaching of intelligent decisions by law-
yers and judges, Dewey adds to this process an instru-
mentalist twist. In a fragment resembling Holmes’
instrumentalist theses, he claims about the logic of judi-
cial decisions that:
[…] it must be a logic relative to consequences rather
than to antecedents, a logic of prediction of probabili-
ties rather than deduction of certainties. For the pur-
poses of a logic of inquiry into probable consequen-
ces, general principles can only be tools justified by
the work they do.74
One is right in attributing to Dewey, therefore, the idea
that the real process by means of which legal decisions
in general – and judicial decisions in particular – are
reached is instrumental in nature. In another passage,
the instrumental nature of normative legal patterns
becomes even clearer:
The ‘universal’ stated in the major premise is not
outside of and antecedent to particular cases; neither
is it a selection of something found in a variety of
cases. It is an indication of a single way of treating
cases for certain purposes or consequences in spite of
their diversity.75
If the reading undertaken here is sound, it seems that
Dewey, in his sparse writings on law, synthesises the
conception of experience and logic typical of philosophi-
cal pragmatism in the narrow sense with an instrumen-
talism quite similar to the one expressed in Holmes’ the-
ses of law as prophecy and in his adoption of efficiency
in bringing forth social benefits as supreme hermeneutic
criteria.
Theoretical pragmatist conceptions of law can then be
seen, apparently, as what happens when the orientation
towards consequences that characterises the pragmatist
movement is read through reductive instrumentalist
lens before being applied to law.
73. J. Dewey, ‘My Philosophy of Law’, in J.A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey:
The Later Works, 1925-1953 (2008) 115; J. Dewey, ‘Logical Method
and Law’, 10 Cornell Law Quarterly 1914 (1925).
74. Dewey (1925), above n. 73, at 26.
75. Dewey (1925), above n. 73, at 22.
5 Dworkin’s Theory of Law as
a Pragmatist Interpretation
of Legal Practices
However, this is a half-truth. There are others theories
in the field of law that could be called pragmatist theo-
ries due to its absorption of one or more of the other
pragmatist commitments, although rejecting instrumen-
talism. This is the case of Dworkin’s Law as Integrity.76
This specific theory of law is commited to methodologi-
cal pragmatism since it takes the point of theorising
about the content of law in general and of rights in par-
ticular as explaining some features of the use of legal
concepts, of judicial adjudication, in short, of legal prac-
tice. This commitment is manifest, for example, when
he criticises accounts of the theoretical divergence in
legal practices that are affected by what he calls semantic
sting, for not being able to encompass the typical situa-
tion of theoretical argumentation in law,
[…] when members of particular communities who
share practices and traditions make and dispute
claims about the best interpretation of these, when
they disagree […] about what some tradition or prac-
tice actually requires in concrete circumstances.77
This theoretical guideline is what lies behind Dworkin’s
interpretive and non-reductionist conception of law
according to which to interpret the law is to identify as
the contents of rights those that show legal social practi-
ces in its best light, running intelligibility and justifiabil-
ity together. In Dworkin’s own words, the theoretical
propositions his theory of law generates
[…] are constructive interpretations: they try to show
legal practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve
equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and
the best justification of that practice. So no firm line
divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any other
aspect of legal practice. […] Jurisprudence is the gen-
eral part of adjudication, silent prologue to any deci-
sion at law.78
Law as Integrity is also committed to semantic pragma-
tism. It rejects the legal positivist strategy of demarcat-
ing the realm of law by means of a factual test. In its
place stands the acknowledgment that the only thing
that can lead us in establishing the propositional content
of the doctrinaire concept law – what the law requires in
novel cases – is the history of previous political and
judicial decisions thought of as continuous and coherent
with the current legal practices of adjudication. In short,
it is a theory that makes the meaning and content of the
legal propositions simultaneously dependent on its his-
torical and present use and on the view of the practition-
76. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5.
77. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5 at 46.
78. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 90.
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ers of what makes the practice valuable. When it comes
to interpretive concepts, the genre to which legal con-
cepts, and the very concept of law, belong, they require
[…] that people share a practice they must converge
in actually treating the concept as interpretive. But
that does not mean converging in the application of
the concept. People can share such a concept even
when they disagree dramatically about its instances.
So a useful theory of an interpretive concept - a theo-
ry of justice - cannot simply report the criteria people
use to identify instances or simply excavate the deep
structure of what people mainly agree are instances.
A useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself
be an interpretation. which is very likely to he contro-
versial, of the practice in which the concept figures.
In my view the doctrinal concept of law functions as
an interpretive concept, at least in complex political
communities. We share that concept as actors in
complex political practices that require us to interpret
these practices in order to decide how best to contin-
ue them, and we use the doctrinal concept of law to
state our conclusions.79
Although the role of value considerations in interpretive
concepts might lead one to think its current and past use
loose relevance in establishing the meaning of these con-
cepts, and therefore might weaken the claim regarding
semantic pragmatism commitments in Dworkin’s theo-
ry, his explicit considerations eschews this conclusion:
It does not follow, even from that rough account, that
an interpreter can make of a practice or work of art
anything he would have wanted it to be, that a citizen
of courtesy who is enthralled by equality, for exam-
ple, can in good faith claim that courtesy actually
requires the sharing of wealth. For the history or
shape of a practice or object constrains the available
interpretations of it, though the character of that con-
straint needs careful accounting.80
Furthermore, Dworkin’s rejection of the ‘semantic
sting’, the counterfactual presupposition of complete
homogeneity in the use of legal concepts in the field of
law, made by positivist theories, does not prevent him
from recognising a partial consensus in the uses that
articulate the meaning of the concept of law. He distin-
guishes the consensual level of social legal practices con-
verging on the concept of law from the controversial
conceptions of this concept:
Discussions about law by and large assume, I suggest,
that the most abstract and fundamental point of legal
practice is to guide and constrain the power of gov-
ernment in the following way. Law insists that force
not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that
would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or
noble these ends, except as licensed or required by
79. Dworkin (2006), above n. 1, at 11.
80. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 52.
individual rights and responsibilities flowing from
past political decisions about when collective force is
justified.81
The controversial conceptions of law, manifest in the
partially different uses of legal concepts by the partici-
pants of social legal practices, stem from the consensual
and conceptual level as they provide different answers to
the three questions raised by the concept:
First, is the supposed link between law and coercion
justified at all? Is there any point to requiring public
force to be used only in ways conforming to rights
and responsibilities that “flow from” past political
decisions? Second, if there is such a point, what is it?
Third, what reading of ‘flow from’ – what notion of
consistency with past decisions – best serves it?82
The commitment to semantic pragmatism is also recog-
nisable in the central place Dworkin’s interpretive con-
ception of law gives to the historical uses of legal con-
cepts in establishing the doctrinaire concept of law:
It insists that the law – the rights and duties that flow
from past collective decisions and for that reason
license or require coercion – contains not only the
narrow explicit content of these decisions but also,
more broadly, the scheme of principles necessary to
justify them. History matters because that scheme of
principle must justify the standing as well as the con-
tent of these past decisions.83
Differently from the other pragmatist commitments,
commitment to fundamental pragmatism does not come
to the fore of Dworkin’s Law as integrity. However,
since there is nothing in Dworkin’s theory of law that
precludes commitment to fundamental pragmatism, and
since this theory is not compatible with any form of pla-
tonist intellectualist order of explanation, this absence
may be credited to the relative irrelevance of investigat-
ing pre-linguistic know how for achieving its theoretical
goals.
The commitment to normative pragmatism, on the oth-
er hand, can be clearly seen in the pride of place Dwor-
kin affords to the idea of norms implicit in practices.
That idea is in the core of his concept of legal principle
and of the distinctive rational process of simultaneously
applying the law and developing the law that he calls
constructive interpretation. In this sense, Law as Integ-
rity
[…] argues that rights and responsibilities flow from
past decisions and so count as legal, not just when
they are explicit in these decisions but also when they
follow from the principles of personal and political
81. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 93.
82. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 94.
83. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 227.
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morality the explicit decisions presuppose by way of
justification.84
Besides having the clear advantage of allowing an ade-
quate treatment of legitimacy questions concerning
social legal practices and institutions, this normative
pragmatist feature of his interpretive conception of law
is also restated and justified in practical terms:
If people accept that they are governed not only by
explicit rules laid down in past political decisions but
by whatever other standards flow from the principles
these decisions assume, then the set of recognized
public standards can expand and contract organically,
as people become more sophisticated in sensing and
exploring what these principles require in new cir-
cumstances, without the need for detailed legislation
or adjudication on each possible point of conflict.85
It is also deserving of notice that this commitment to the
existence of norms implicit in practices is one that none
of the self-titled legal pragmatists undertook. They sug-
gest a kind of skepticism about rights to the judges. It is
the strategy of acting ‘as if’ there were rights originating
from the norms explicitly codified in the forms of rules.
But they see this strategy as just one more way of ‘inter-
preting’ the law and fixing its meaning aiming at an
increase in social benefit. What follows from this is the
conditional character of the strategy: it should be
employed when and only when it supposedly leads to an
increase in social benefit. Consequently, rights derived
from rules are a considered a (sometimes) useful fiction.
They do not really exist. The opposite of that concep-
tion is to recognise norms as real even when they are
implicit in practices. In doing so, Law as Integrity
[…] requires our judges, so far as this is possible, to
treat our present system of public standards as
expressing and respecting a coherent set of princi-
ples, and, to that end, to interpret these standards to
find implicit standards between and beneath the
explicit ones.86
If this is correct, one can start to understand how the
employment of Brandom’s analysis of philosophical
pragmatism equips one to do what this paper set out to
do from the beginning: bring Dworkin closer to philo-
sophical pragmatism. It is possible to see now that his
conception of law is incompatible not with philosophical
pragmatism in the broad sense as defined by the four
pragmatist commitments that articulate its theories. On
the contrary, Dworkin’s theory of law adopts explicitly
three of them and is highly compatible with the fourth.
Its incompatibility regards merely the strategy adopted
by the classical pragmatists for working out their com-
mitment to normative pragmatism in the context of
84. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 96.
85. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 188.
86. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5, at 217.
their Darwinian naturalist commitments, namely,
instrumentalism about norms, and its legal expression.
But this strategy is entirely optional. Commitment to a
naturalist order of explanation is not required by prag-
matism in the broad sense. In the same spirit, commit-
ment to instrumentalism is optional even for someone
committed to naturalism. Its rejection count as rejecting
at most some features of pragmatism as construed in a
narrow sense. It is doubtful that committing to a reduc-
tive instrumentalism about norms is inevitable even if
one wants to give a naturalist account of the norms
implicit in practices. Brandom’s own account of the
emergence of the norms implicit in our discursive prac-
tice in the first chapter of Making it Explicit can be read
as a kind of weak naturalistic explanation of normativity.87
Since the conception of law as integrity undertakes at
least three of the four theoretical commitments that
defines pragmatism in the broad sense, and since legal
pragmatism, despite sharing instrumentalist commit-
ments with classical pragmatism, undertakes no more
than three of these commitments, we can draw the con-
clusion that Dworkin’s (2007) conception of law is enti-
tled to be understood as an application of philosophical
pragmatism to the legal field, at least as much as legal
pragmatism is.88
87. R. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive
Commitment (1998), at 3-66.
88. Dworkin (1986), above n. 5.
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